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During the past several years our research interest in individual economic
behavior has resulted in conducting experiments in token economies with
human subjects and in operant conditioning chambers using laboratory
animals. In the context of the present volume these experimental methodolo-
gies may be viewed as an econometric research strategya method for
gathering data to analyse statistically economic theories and relationships.
The primary distinguishing characteristic of this research strategy lies in the
use of data collected by the investigator, rather than relying on data collected
as an input to, or by-product of, government administrative procedures.
This has two advantages. First, collecting one's own data frequently provides
the least cost method, sometimes the only method, for obtaining observations
adequate to investigating certain hypotheses. Second, using experimental
methods the investigator has the ability to manipulate environmental con-
ditions to provide as precise and demanding tests of the hypotheses in
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question as ethica' and legal restrictions,and the technologies at his disposal,
allow. In short, experimental methodscomplement existing econometric
methods for evaluating economic theoriesby providing an observational
basis for examining aspects of those theorieswhich could not be done using
routinely available data or which would beconsiderably more expensive to
evaluate using nonexperimental methods.
This paper sets out to explicate, byexample, this use of token economy
and laboratory animal experiments. Emphasiswill be placed on method-
ological issues which arise in using thesetechnologies in economic research
rather than on any comprehensive reviewof experimental results. The first,
and major, part of the paperconcerns the use of these methodologies in
studying theories of individual subjectbehavior. Following this, we indicate
how these research methodscan be used to study directly aggregate economic
behavior and policy orientated researchquestions.
1. Experimental Studies of Individual Behavior
The SlutskyHicks theory of commoditydemand and labor supply be-
havior is integral to much of economicanalysis. While this is a theory of
individual subject behavior, the theoryhas only infrequently been investi-
gated using individual subject dataas the unit of analysis. A proximate cause
of the lack of empirical research in thisarea is that the vast majority of
existing observations of economic activity consistof cross-sectional data or
aggregate time series data. Tokeneconomy experiments and studies of lab-
oratory animal behavior provide unique opportunitiesto collect individual
subject data suitable to investigating these theories.'
Figure 1 illustrates this point. Each panel showsthe labor supply curve
for an individual worker, a rat working foralcohol in an operant conditioning
chamber (a) and a human working for alcohol ina simplified token economy
(b). Although economic textbooks and journalsare replete with hypothetical
illustrations of backward bending labor supplyfunctions, the data in Fig. 1
are, to our knowledge, the first exemplification of sucha relationship using
data for individual workers toappear in literature.
Experimentation in token economies must satisfy establishedethical and legal standards
for studies with human subjects (Rivlin & Timpane,1975). Universities and funding agencies
have institutional structures to enforce these standards. Thiswill restrict certain economic
experiments to nonhuman populations (Kagelet al., 1975). Research on economic processes in
token systems also has an important role to play inenhancing the therapeutic effectiveness of
these systems (Winkler, 1971).0
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Fig. 1. Labor supply behavior of a rat (a) and a human (b) working for alcohol. Data for
the rat are from Meisch & Thompson (1973). Human data are from Bieglow and Leibson (1972).
In both (a) and (b) curves were sketched freehand to indicate their characteristic shape. Wage
rates have been indexed with a value of 100 assigned to the midpoint of the ratio requirements
imposed.
1.1. ON BRINGING BEHAVIOR INTO THE LABORATORY
An immediate question which arises with respect to the data reported in
Fig. 1 is whether or not it legitimately represents a labor supply function;
i.e., how does one translate the behavior of everyday liIe into the laboratory?
In answer to this we note, as a general principle, that it is not necessary, nor
is it desirable in many cases, to establish a direct physical analog between
behavior in the laboratory and outside it. Rather, what is required is to
develop a process within the laboratory with all the essential properties of
the economic behavior under investigation and then to study the effects of
alterations in parameter values on that behavior (Sidman, 1960). Technically
the establishment of such a laboratory environment corresponds to the
development of a formal empirical interpretation system (Basmann, 1975) or
a definite set of semantic rules (Brunner, 1967) for the uninterpreted theory
in question. Any "pure" economic theory permits a number of alternative
interpretation systems, no one of which is a priori correct. The sole restriction
is that the interpretation system does not introduce logical inconsistencies
into the theory.2 Changes in the interpretation system may alter test outcomes
2See Brunner (1967) for an example of where the semantic rules themselves introduce
inconsistencies into the theory. In this context it should be mentioned that the problems en-
countered in developing a "pure" economic theory to the point where an economically efficient
empirical interpretation system can be operationalized and competing hypotheses tested against
each other are not unique to using nonexperimental data, but frequently are the most difficult
problems in designing an experiment also. The fact is that many extant presentations of "pure"
economic theories have been left very crudely formulated or have been formulated in such a
way that they are virtually immune from falsification (Basmann, 1975). For citation of similar
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or estimated parameter values in the same way that modifications of the
assumptions of the "pure" theorymay alter its deductive implications. It is,
in fact, the task of the decentralized researchprocess to explore the effects of
alterations in these rules, without which the "pure"or uninterpreted theory
says nothing about the world.
The procedures underlying the data reported in Fig.1 provide an example
of such an empirical interpretationsystem. In both experiments value was
induced on an arbitrary job taskleverpressingthrough giving subjects
with strong preferences for alcoholaccess to limited amounts of this com-
modity as a result of performing the job taska predetermined number of
times. This experimentally induced constrainton behavior can be written as
C = rW, (1)
where the amount of work performed (number of leverpresses) is denoted
by W, r is the experimenter determinedwage rate (the inverse of the number
of lever presses required per ounce of alcohol consumed), and Cis total al-
cohol consumption or total income earnings in thisworld with one economic
good.
Since the length of the experimental sessionswas time determined,
subjects faced a second constraint
T=L+I7, (2)
where T is total time of the experimental session, J'i'is time spent lever
pressing, and L is time spent in "leisure" activities(time not spent lever
pressing). Since the amount of time takento complete a level press can for
all practical purposes be treatedas a constant,
W= cW (3)
Assuming subjects' preferences between income and leisurecan be repre-
sented by a quasi-concave utility function with the usualproperties, the
constraints (1)(3) establish a basis for investigating laborsupply behavior
in the laboratory. Typical labor supply functions resultingfrom such inves-
tigations are reported in Fig. 1. Figure 2 shows therelationship between the
demand for income and effort price (1/r) correspondingto each of the labor
supply functions in Fig. 1. The inverse relationshipbetween income and
effort price shown is a well established law of animalbehavior (Battalio,
Kagel, & Green, 1979; Allison, 1979).
See Allison (1979) and Staddon (1979) for additional results taken fromthe literature in
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Fig. 2. Demand for income as a function of its effort price for the rat reported in Fig. la
and the human reported in Fig. lb. Curves sketched by freehand.
It is quite clear that the interpretation system developed above charac-
terizes a highly simplified labor-leisure choice processa one-commodity,
one-job world. Although there may be no exact physical analog to these
procedures outside the laboratory, they contain all the essential character-
istics needed to define a logically consistent empirical interpretation system
for a simple Slutsky-Hicks labor supply model. As such, they can be em-
ployed to test important properties of the model such as the negativity of the
Slutsky substitution effect, the common assumption that leisure (not working)
is a superior good throughout the choice set, and Robbins' (1930) suggestion
that the demand for income will be inverse to its effort price. (Some initial
outcomes of these investigations and their relationship to more familiar
econometric studies using aggregate per capita or cross-sectional data are
discussed in the following sections.)
The process of developing an experimental analog to an economic theory
is similar to the development of the theory itself; start with something simple
and then add more complex characteristics to the system and see how
behavior is altered.4 While a fairly obvious basis exists for adding additional
dimensions to the labor-leisure choice problem for humans, a similar basis
exists for subhumans also. In both cases a number of alternative or multiple
job tasks can be introduced into the situation, including ones with non-
pecuniary returns (nonzero response rates in the absence of explicit payoffs),
see Battalioet al.(1979). In addition, highly preferred (or multiple) com-
modities can be introduced, including nonfood items, and one can extend
the analysis to wage rate schedules other than the simple piecework schedules
underlying the data in Figs. 1 and 2 (Battalioet al.,1979).
Budgetary considerations also dictate proceeding in this way since increasing the com-
plexity of these experiments would increase both their time and dollar costs.384 JOHN H. KAGEL AND RAYMOND C. BATTALIO
1.2. METHODOLOGICAL ASIDE: WHY STUDYTHE ECONOMIC
BEHAVIOR OF NONHUMANS?
The application of experimental methodsto the study of nonhuman
economic behavior is predicated ona number of factors. It has precedence
in comparative studies of animal behavior whichare well established fields in
psychology and biology. One important outcome of these researchprograms
has been to indicate that the laws and principles of economicbehavior would
be virtually unique if they did not apply, withsome variation of course, to
nonhumans as well as humans. Thuswe proceed under the assumption that
there is behavioral, as well as physiological, continuityacross species, and
if we identify genuine instances where this continuity breaksdown, we shall
have obtained a great deal of insight into the functional,or evolutionary,
basis of the behavior in question.
This continuity in behavioralprocesses across species enables us to
exploit the fact that the economic cost of experiments withnonhumans is
considerably lower than the cost of comparable research withhumans.
Figure 1 provides a partial indication of this, where lessthan half as many
data points are found for the human subjectas compared to those for the
rat.5 Further, experiments using animals permita degree of control and
manipulation of experimental conditions thatmay be necessary for inves-
tigating some hypotheses but whichare unethical or illegal when applied to
humans. For example, tests of the hypothesis put forward by Stigler& Becker
(1977) that differences in "tastes" between individualsat a point in time are
a function of differences in behavioral histories (analyzable withina neo-
classical economic framework), rather than differences in geneticmakeup,
require enforced separation of parents from offspring. Such studiescan only
be performed using laboratory animals.
One might still argue against the relevance of subhumansas models for
the experimental analysis of economic theorieson the grounds that these
theories postulate an element of calculating optimization that onlyhumans
can perform. We do not argue that humans can consciously calculate.
However, it is not clear that one can demonstrate, observationally, that such
calculations actually underlie the behavior that theSlutskyHicks theory
attempts to characterize or that subhumans do notposses similar calculating
abilities, albeit on a much more primitive level. Further,a number of prom-
inent economic theorists have recognized that the abilityto calculate con-
sciously is irrelevant to characterizing behavioras a solution to a constrained
Although exact figures are not available,a conservative estimate would place the cost of
experiments using human subjects at four times that of comparable experiments usingnon-
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optimization problem
it is possible to formulate our conditions of equilibrium as those of
an extremum problem, even though it is admittedly not a case of an
individual's behaving in a maximizing manner, just as it is often possible
in classical dynamics to express the path of a particle as one which
maximizes (minimizes) some quantity despite the fact that the particle
is obviously not acting consciously or purposively (Samuelson, 1947,
p. 23).
The only question that one can answer observationally is under what con-
ditions do the predictions of our theories seem to accord with the "facts" of
behavior.6 We turn to this use of token economy and laboratory animal
experiments in the following sections.
1.3. USE OF INDIVIDUAL OBSERVATIONS IN HYPOTHESIS
TESTING AND THEORY DEVELOPMENT
A number of well-known problems are encountered in testing the
SlutskyHicks theory using aggregate per capita or cross-sectional data from
national economies. First, it is readily demonstrated that aggregation prob-
lems in going from individual to aggregate commodity demand or labor
supply functions are such that even if all individuals were to behave in
accordance with the SlutskyHicks theory, the aggregate data need not
(Hicks, 1956, chap. 6). This means that falsification or confirmation of the
SlutskyHicks restrictions on functions applied to such data cannot logically
falsify or verify the theory of individual behavior underlying it without
assuming that a rather severe set of additional restrictions are met (Gorman,
1953; Green, 1964; Muellbauer, 1975). Assuming for the moment that these
additional restrictions are satisfied so that SlutskyHicks properties apply
to the aggregate data, important problems in testing the theory still remain.
One of the most important of these is that some model specification is needed
to make computation possible, thereby making it impossible to be sure that
the tests performed are those of the assumptions underlying the general
theory rather than tests of the particular utility function used to derive (or
implied by) the estimating equations (Phlips, 1975; Basmann, Battalio, &
Kagel, 1973).
6The problem of sorting out between calculating optimization and "as if" optimization
comes down to specifying those predictions of the theory which hold up in the one case but not
in the other, and then observing what the animals (both human and subhuman) actually do.
We are unaware of any efforts along these lines to date.386 JOHN H. KAGEL AND RAYMOND C. BATALIO
Use of individual subject data as the unit of analysis avoids the first of
the problems mentioned. Appropriate manipulations of experimental con-
ditions then permit testing necessary conditions which must be satisfied if
any member of the class of SlutskyHicks utility functions is to characterize
the data.7'8 Examples follow.
Figure 3 reports some initial tests of the negativity of the Slutsky-
substitution effect (equivalently, tests of the weak axiom of revealed pref-
erence) in the context of the incomeleisure interpretation system developed
in Section i.i. The point labeled A on budget line K° in each panel shows
the incomeleisure choice of four pigeons under the same initial (baseline)
wage rate schedule. Following the establishment of stable baseline conditions,
each bird was given one half of its average baseline income earnings in the
form of nonwage payments programmed for delivery throughout the session.
At the same time, wage rates were halved so that the new budget line would
pass through the original equilibrium point A, resulting in budget line K' in
each case. For all subjects the equilibrium incomeleisure point, shown by
the letter B, occurred somewhere along the dashed portion of K', as it must
if the choice process in question is to be characterized by a member of the
class of SlutskyHicks theories. Tests in addition to those reported in Fig. 3
have been conducted at four different baseline wage rates and with different
levels of nonwage income. These tests continue to show negativity of the
Slutsky-substitution effect at all but the very highest wage rate where there
appears to be either a great deal of instability in the labor supply schedule
itself or some systematic alteration of subjects preferences occurring as a
result of experiencing the wage rate in question (unpublished 0
' These tests do not involveany approximations to some unspecified utility function, as do
some of the proposed tests of SlutskyHicks restrictions reported in the literature. See Basmann
et al., (1973) and Phlips (1974, Chap. 2) for discussion of the problems such approxiñiations
introduce into the analysis.
8Experiments in preference theory using individual subject data as the unit of observation
are not new to economics (May, 1954; Rousseas & Hart, 1951; Thurstone, 1931). What is new
about our experiments is that the technologies employed result in the commodities and/or jobs
in the choice set being an integral part of the ongoing activities of subjects for reasonably long
periods of time. This automatically induces nontrivial values on the outcomes of individual
responses to the experimental contingencies, an important element in effectively designing
economic experiments (Siegel, 1961; Smith, 1976) and a serious deficiency in eartier experimentat
studies (see McCrimmon & Toda, 1969, for citations to this earlier literature).
These experiments are being conducted in collaboration with Professor Len Green of the
Department of Psychology at Washington University.
10This is no easy point to sort out. It takes approximately 3 to 34 months to obtain each
data point in this region of the choice space while maintaining subjects at a constant (80% of
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Fig. 3. Effects of income compensated wage rate changes on labor supply. Closed circles
are mean choices over the lastS days of an experimental condition. Standard errors of the mean
are too small to graph, averaging between 1-2% of mean income. (*, 3-second accesses to food
hopper) [Redrawn from Battalio, Kagel, & Green (1979, Fig. 6).]
Additional tests of the SlutskyHicks theory are reported by Allison,
Miller, & Wozny (1979, Experiment 3), where the authors examine whether
or not the labor supply schedule is affected by changes in nominal wage rates
that leave the real wage rate unaffected. Using rats as subjects, three nominal
wage rates were studied-5 lever presses for 5 licks at a water tube, 10 lever
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presses for 10 licks, and 20 lever presses for 20 licksall of which leave the
wage rate unaffected. When travel time between the lever and water tube was
negligible, Allison et al. report no significant differences in quantity of labor
supplied (response rates) with changes in the ratio of lever presses to licks.
Having established that some of the SlutskyHicks properties hold for
individual labor supply functions under a given interpretation system pro-
vides a basis upon which to conduct additional studies. These fall into
several broad categories:
tests of additional restrictions which must hold if members of the
class of SlutskyHicks theories are to organize the data;
establishment of lawful relationships between variables which are
not deducible on the basis of the SlutskyHicks restrictions alone (Battalio
et al., 1979);
identification of particular utility functions for which simple changes
in parameter values will organize large bodies of experimental data across
different species (Staddon, 1979; Rachlin, 1978);
exploration of the effects of alterations in the interpretation system;
i.e., alterations in experimental procedures, on behavior; and
contrasts of the economic analysis of the experimental outcomes
with competing psychological explanations in an effort to distinguish between
explanatory frameworks (Rachlin & Burkhard, 1978; Staddon & Motheral,
1978; Heyman & Luce, 1979).
In the process of exploring experimental analogs to the SlutskyHicks
theory a number of experimental results have been identified which current
theoretical formulations fail to handle. For example, in studying consumer
demand behavior we have adhered to ABA types of experimental designs
(A is the baseline or some initial set of experimental conditions, B a change
in these conditions, and A a return to baseline conditions) which permit
a comparison of steady state consumption patterns between baseline
periods. While consumption patterns are typically quite similar between
baseline conditions as compared to the intervening B condition, frequently
they do not revert completely, suggesting that habits developed during
the B period carried over into the following A period (Battalio et al., 1973;
Kagel et al., 1975), An example of this is reported in Fig. 4. Although we
have not had to search far for economic theories' which suggest such
irreversibilities. in consumption patterns (Marshall, 1920, Appendix H;
Georgescu-Roegen, 1966, Chap. 2), they are by no means universal (Kagel
et al., 1975). Further, we have not, at present, identified the set of initial















PRICE CHANGE B BASELINE A
I
I I
Fig. 4. Effects of income compensated price changes on root beer consumption for a rat
choosing between root beer and Tom Collins mix.RB gives the relative price of root beer
Closed circles are mean consumption values for the last 10 days of each condition, with brackets
showing standard error of the mean. Consumption between A periods is significantly different
at the .01 level using a two-tailed (-test (t = 3.13, degrees of freedom = 18). [Data from
Kagel e( al. (1975).]
ical literature provides few hints as to what these conditions might be.
In addition, looking at the day-to-day adjustments in consumption patterns
following a change in experimental conditions we find that concepts of
habit formation (Phlips, 1974) do not consistently organize these adjust-
ment paths. In fact, at times just the opposite seems to occur, with the animal
initially consuming more of the commodity whose relative price has been
lowered than in the steady state pattern of consumption (unpublished data).
It remains to be seen what concepts in the literature, if any, organize these
adjustment paths.
Finally, at times we have found behavior which economic theory simply
does not address. For example, in our first studies of consumer demand
behavior with food and water as commodities we found that sharp rota-
tions in the budget line through an initial equilibrium consumption bundle
could result in severe disruptions in subjects' behavior. This disruptionwas
evidenced by thirsty and hungry rats consistently spending less than their
income allowance and experiencing relatively large weight losses which
would inhibit their ability to survive (Kagel et al., 1975). There is nothing
in existing theoretical formulations that would lead us to anticipate such
a result.
We do not find these failures of behavior to conform to existing principles
of economic theory particularly disturbing. Results of this type are bound
to occur in the process of experimental investigations and serve to point
out existing areas of ignorance concerning the behavioral process under390 JOHN H. KAGEL AND RAYMOND C. BATFALIO
investigation. Given the large components of introspection and casual
empiricism underlying current formulations of economic theories of indi-
vidual choice behavior, the failure to identify existing areas of ignorance
would be remarkable indeed. The use of laboratory experimental methods
provides a ready-made basis for collecting the additional data needed to
close these gaps in our understanding.
1.4. CRITERIA FOR EVALUATING EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS:
INTERNAL VERSUS EXTERNAL VALIDiTY
In evaluating experimental results, maintaining a distinction between
internal and external validity is most useful (Campbell, 1957). Internal
validity concerns the reliability of the results reported, without which any
experiment is uninterpretable: Did the experimental treatments in fact
make a difference? External validity concerns questions of generalizability:
To what populations, settings, and variables can the effects reported be
generalized?
The primary method for establishing internal validity in studies of
individual subject behavior is the use of within-subject designs where each
subject serves as its own control (Sidman, 1960). The most commonly
employed design is of the ABA type, an example of which was reported
in Fig. 4. In this design the experimental control of a variable is demonstrated
through showing that the behavior can be altered and then returned to its
initial level through altering experimental conditions. This approach com-
pletely bypasses variability due to intersubject differences and enables one
to directly observe individual behavior responses. Following the return
to baseline conditions experimental treatments will commonly be extended
either through repeating the B condition exactly (direct replication) or
introducing a similar but different experimental treatment (systematic
replication), e.g., if the B phase involves an increase in the relative price
of a given commodity, a systematic replication might involve a decrease
in its relative price.
Within-subject designs of this type are ideally suited to testing theories
of individual consumer demand and labor supply behavior which make
directional predictions concerning responses to changes in equilibrium
conditions. The key assumption underlying the ABA design, namely, that
behavior is reversible when baseline conditions are reinstated, is generally
assumed with respect to comparative static propositions in economic theory
also. It is worth emphasising that the use of ABA type designs does not
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same, rather, that there is a significant reversal of response patterns with
the return to baseline conditions (see Fig. 4). In those cases for which the
reversibility assumption does not hold, alternative within-subject designs
are available (Sidman, 1960; Kazdin, 1973) or the researcher must use a
between-subject design.1'
Intersubject replication is also important in establishing internal validity,
with the number of replications needed, in part, a function of the extent
to which results reported are consistent with earlier experimental findings.
Under all circumstances one is likely to encounter smaller subject sample
sizes than economists are used to working with. The smaller sample sizes
are, in part, a result of the high degree of control of environmental con-
ditions maintained in laboratory experiments which tends to promote
uniformity of response patterns, relative to baseline performance levels, if
the independent variable being manipulated is in fact controlling behavior
(see Fig.3).12 Further, in thosecases where behavior is not consistently
responding to experimental treatments because of some hypothesized
inability to control an element of the environment, a more direct solution
is to bring this element under control or, if this is too costly, to increase
the magnitude of the independent variable under investigation so that the
differences between baseline and experimental conditions are now observa-
tionally distinguishable. On the other hand, if the hypothesis is that behavior
is not under control because of prior behavioral histories or genetic
differences, a more direct solution is to find populations to sample with
more homogeneous behavioral and/or genetic backgrounds.
In reporting the outcomes of our experiments, questions frequently
arise concerning the generalizability of the results reported because they
are based on samples from such "unrepresentative" populations relative
It has recently been suggested that greatly increased efficiency could be achieved in
social policy experiments, such as the New Jersey income maintenance experiment, using
within-subject designs (Hall, 1975), while the use of extended baseline (preexperimental) measures
of behavior seems preferable to modeling individual response rates as a strategy for reducing
between-subject variability in these studies (Cain etal., 1974, p. 206; Hall, 1975). Psychologists
commonly adopt both strategies in applied settings (Winett, 1976).
12In animal studies using own subject control designs, 2-4 intersubject replications using
subjects drawn from the same strain of a given species have proved sufficient, in practice, to insure
internal validity, i.e., to insure direct replicability of experimental outcomes with a very high
probability. This results from the homogeneous genetic and environmental history of the parent
population from which subjects are drawn, along with the strong cOntrol of nonexperimental
factors possible in animal studies. In the absence of cost constraints more direct replications
within a given strain would undoubtedly be reported. However, under present cost conditions
substantially greater payoffs are to be realized through direct replication using another strain
or another species and/or through systematic replications with the same strain.392 JOHN H. KAGEL AND RAYMOND C. BA11ALIO
to our common concerns with behavior in national economies. This is a
question regarding the external validity of the results reportedto which
there are a number of general answers. First, questions of external validity
are not, of course, confined to experimental research butare endemic to
nonexperimental work as well (see Campbell & Stanley (1966) for illustrations
of the common nature of the sources of such threats inboth experimental
and nonexperimental research). Second, questions of external validity,like
all questions of inductive inference,are never completely answerable even
in theory. However, partial answersare obtained by further empirical
research directed at verification of the initial observationswithin an ever
widening set of conditions. This is the role of replication, both systematic
and direct, especially by independent researchteams, within an experi-
mental science. The discovery and explanation ofapparent failures to
replicate previous experimental outcomes results in additionsto and
refinements in experimental methods and/or theconcepts and relations in
the uninterpreted theory under study. As such, these "failures"are something
experimenters seek, rather than shy away from. Third, for economicreasons
(questions of costs versus benefits) and forreasons of internal validity, the
sine qua non of experimentation, behavioral scientists frequently seekout
"unrepresentative" populations to work with. For example, economiccon-
siderations were in large part responsible for our study ofconsumer demand
behavior in a token economy with long-term psychiatric patients (Battalio
et al., 1973, 1974) since the costs of setting up a token system with volunteer
households from the community lay outside the budgetwe had to work
with. Considerations of internal validity have also motivated biologiststo
use protozoa in consumer behavior studies in order to minimize the complex
learning and training effects observed for vertabrates with their possible
affects on preferences, a confounding factor to be controlled for instudying
responses to price and income changes (Covich, 1972).
With respect to specific questions of generalizability associated with
using populations from token economies and nonhuman subjects, there
are two final points worth making. First, a technological basis exists for
replicating token economy experiments across differing token systems with
markedly different population characteristicsas well as for replication
outside the token economy. For example,we have conducted tests of com-
parable propositions within consumer demand theory usingas subjects
laboratory animals (Kagel et al.,1975), long-term psychiatric patients
(Battalio et al., 1973), and stutterers ina token economy who were tem-
porarily on leave from positions in the nationaleconomy (Cenar, 1976),
while studies using budget reports represent field trials of these propositions
(Koo, 1963; Mossin, 1972). Granted a technological basis for experimentally
verifying the generality of results reported,an important factor underlyingTOKEN ECONOMY AND ANIMAL MODELS 393
the choice of technology for the initial collection of particular kinds of
observations is the strictly economic one of costs versus benefits, on which
criteria investigations using token economies with institutionalized popula-
tions and operant chambers with laboratory animals frequently score quite
well. It seems inefficient to forgo such laboratories on the grounds that
the results may not generalize to more "normal" populations under more
"normal" conditions, particularly when the historical record indicates that
the probabilities of such failures are a priori considerably less than one.
Such laboratories can, at the least, serve as initial screening devices for
testing a number of economic hypotheses, the failure of which stimulates
the collection of comparable data for more "normal" subjects or the refor-
mulation of the underlying theoretical propositions.
Second, experimental studies of economic behavior of animals and
institutionalized populations in token systems expand considerably the
scope for comparative analysis in economics and as such are of scientific
value in their own right. Within this framework differences between these
unusual subject populations and their more "normal" counterparts are as
of much interest as are similarities. Understanding the causes and adaptive
functions of these differences and similarities can add enormously to our
understanding of economic behavior in general.13
13Kourilsky & Hirshliefer (1976) have criticized token economies as corresponding too
closely to traditional reactive models of economic man. They argue that self-determination and
creativity are an essential element of economic decision making lost in more formal models of
optimizing behavior and in token economies as well. They also cite studies of"overjustification"
effectsthe hypothesis that a person's intrinsic interest in an activity may be undermined by
inducing him to engage in that activity as an explicit means to some extrinsic goalas an
important potential therapeutic defect in token economies, which they hypothesize to result
from subjects' reactions to the manipulative nature of the system. This line of argument has
suggested to some that token economies are inappropriate vehicles for the experimental analysis
of economic behavior, an implication we strongly disagree with.
The criticism that token systemscorrespond too closely to reactive models of economic
man, deficient in some essential respect to behavior in national economies, is a criticism of
economic theory rather than the use of token systems to test theories, an issue which V. L.
Smith addresses elsewhere in this volume. Further, the planned economic environments we
discuss here include a broad range of organizational structures which in some cases permit a
great deal of self-determination on subjects part, e.g., in a pilot study preceding the cannabis
experiments reported in the text, subjects successfully struck fdr higher wages midway through
the experiment (Kagel, Battalio, & Miles, in press)! In practice there is an inverse correlation
between the manipulative nature of token systems, as Kourilsky and Hirshliefr use that term,
and the degree of functional autonomy subjects are physically and mentally capable of per-
forming. Finally, recent research (Mynatt et al., 1978; Fisher, 1979) questions the robustness
and generalizability of overjustification effects beyond the most limited of conditions and
indicates that the phenomena has been identified only once in a functioning token economy,
although this has not prevented authors from discussing the practical implications of their
findings for these systems.394 JOHN H. KAGEL AND RAYMOND C. BA11ALIO
2. Studies of Aggregate Economic Behavior and MorePolicy
Oriented Research Questions
2.1. ALCOHOL AND DRUG RESEARCH
Token systems and animal models have been used forsome time now
to address behavioral problems of immediate policy interest in thearea of
alcohol and drug research(Bigelow & Liebson, 1972; Meisch &Thompson,
1973; Nathan etal., 1972). One of the most ambitious tokeneconomy studies
of this kind was Miles and Congrieve'suse of a "microeconomy" to study
the socioeconomic effects of heavy, continuous marihuanasmoking (Miles
et al.,1974). This controlled economic environment housed volunteer
subjects continuously for 98 days in the facilities of the AddictionResearch
Foundation of Toronto, Canada.
To study the amotivational effects of marihuanaon work performance,
subjects could weave unlimited numbers of woolen beltson small portable
hand looms, receiving $2.50 (Canadian currency) for eachacceptable belt
completed. The induced value for this job taskwas far from trivial, resulting
in subjects averaging 8 hours of worka day throughout the study and
netting as much as $5000 by the end of the experiment. Theconsumer goods
provided (free of charge) consisted of assignment, in pairs,to semiprivate
rooms with heat, lights, and cleaning services also provided. All other
goods had to be purchased from production earnings. Astore on the premises
offered canteen items, including a full line of alcoholicbeverages; recreation
facilities were available for small rental fees includinga gymnasium, sauna,
and swimming; meals were available at the hospital; and staffmembers
were regularly available to purchase retail items outside the hospital at
market prices and to escort subjectson field trips. Three experiments with
19-20 subjects each were conducted in thiseconomy, which is the closest
approximation to date of Oskar Morgenstern's (1954) notion of establishing
communities for the explicit purpose of conducting economic experiments.
While relatively expensive and difficult torun, this economy is illustrative
of the possibilities in this area (alsosee Bigelow, Emurian, & Brady (1975)
for a similar technology of equal ambition).
Table 1 reports the results of t tests for the effects of marihuanaon
the primary measure of productivity, number of belts produced, in each of
the three experiments. As can be seen, no significant differences in production
between experimental and control groups were found inany of the experi-
ments. Combined evaluation of the outcome of the experiments using
Fisher's Z statistic (Winer, 1971) does nothing to alter theacceptance ofTOKEN ECONOMY AND ANIMAL MODELS 395
TABLE 1
CHANGES IN PRODUCTION RELATIVE TO PREDRUG PERIOD'
Meanchange t statistic
Number of daysNumber ofin production(probability
ExperimentTreatment" of treatment subjects (increase) t0)'
Data from Kagel, Battalio, & Miles (in press).
All experiments had a 17 days predrug period. Predrug production levels computed over
the last 9 days of the predrug period. For the first week of the predrug period production was
close to zero as subjects learned the job task.
Experimental subjects required to smoke two (1 gram) cigarettes containing 8 mg of
A9-THC (the major active compound in hashish and marihuana) nightly. See Source for details
of experimental design.
In both experiments I and II one subject left during the study. Data for these subjects have
been excluded from the analysis.
dProbability levels computed on the basis of a two-tailed alternative to the null hypothesis
that the change in Experimental less the change in Control was equal to zero.
the null hypothesis of no difference between groups(Z =.53; probability
Z0= .59).Additional analysis of data on hours worked, output per
hour, and activities during periods immediately following smoking were
used to suggest a general behavioral relationship between marihuana and
work performance (Kagel, Battalio, & Miles, in press), the details of which
go beyond the scope of the present paper.
Obvious subject preselection biases, the special nature of the job task
used in the experiments, the details of the structure of the microeconomy,
and a number of other factors limit the ability to generalize the results of
these experiments to working conditions in national economic systems.
However, the data do falsify the contention that heavy use of marihuana
is inherently incompatible with maintaining productivity levels and the
capacity to carry out vocational responsibilities; propositions of some
concern to both the United States and Canadian Commissions on man-
huana and drug abuse. The experimental results also suggest a set of cir-
cumstances whereby regular marihuana use would be compatible with
no alterations in productivity levels within national economic systems
(Kagelet ci.,in press). These are limited but valuable findings. They are of
I Experimental 49 10 91% 1.55
Control 49 9 60% (.14)
II Experimental 53 9 64% .81
Control 53 10 36% (.43)
III Experimental 56 10 43% 1.38
Control 56 10 71% (.19)396 JOHN H. KAGEL AND RAYMOND C. BATFALIO
interest in their own right and as inputs into designing and evaluating the
potential cost effectiveness of longer term andmore expensive epidemilogical
studies within national economies.
Nonhuman subjects have also been extensively used to study the be-
havioral effects of alcohol and other drugs. The rat data reported in Fig. 1
were generated in one such study. The question addressed there was whether
or not alcohol intake would be responsive to changes in costs of consumption,
as proved to be the case. The acknowledged fact in biology and psychology
that behavioral laws do not stop suddenlyat the boundary separating
humans from nonhumans provides the foundation for such studies.
2.2. STUDIES OF INCOME DISTRIBUTION
Records of individual subject earnings, maintained in thecourse of
studying consumer demand behavior in the Central Islip tokeneconomy
(Battalio etal., 1973, 1974) and the effects of marihuanause in the Cannabis
economy, provide a basis for studying the distribution of income in these
economies. Such distributions are of special interest since theywere generated
under conditions for which many of the allegedsources of unequal incomes
in national economies, such as discrimination, monopoly restrictions, and
costs of occupational training and experience, had been eliminatedor were
greatly reduced (Battalio, Kagel, & Reynolds, 1977). The primary factors
responsible for income differences in these economieswere differences in
tastes for market income versus leisure and differences in abilities working
manual job tasks.
Striking similarities were found in comparingmeasures of income
dispersion in the experimental economies with those of the United States
and other market economies. Table 2 reports comparisons basedon the
Gini coefficient. These results suggest that differences in abilitiesto perform
simple manual job tasks and preferences for market incomeare sufficient
to generate income dispersions similar to those observed in nationalecono-
mies, a point which has been seriously questioned in the literature (Fair,
1971; Blinder, 1974). Note that this is not thesame thing as asserting that
the distribution of income in the United States is created solely by individual
differences in ability and effort. Here too there are obvious differences
between the institutional structure and population characteristics of the
experimental and national economies which prevent such generalizations.
But these token economy results falsify the contention the incomes will
necessarily be more evenly distributed in a world where allsources of income
differences, except ability and tastes for leisure,are eliminated. In this respect
the analysis serves the traditional function of experimentation in the bio-Source: Battlio, R. C., Kagel, J. H., & Reynolds,
nomies. Journal of Political Econony, 1977,85, 1259
rights reserved.
Experimental economies.
M. Income distributions in two experimental eco-
-1272. © 1977 by The University of Chicago. All
logical and behavioral sciencesto isolate basic relationships under con-
trolled conditions.
The successful development of a labor supply model using rats and
pigeons as subjects provides a natural basis for extending the token economy
studies of income distributions. Maintaining similar rearing and home cage
environments in such experiments would control for the effects of previous
behavioral history on labor supply, a potential contaminating factor in the
token economy studies. Alternatively one could systematically vary rearing
and/or home cage environment to determine the effects of different life expe-
riences on performance. Use of nonhuman subjects would also facilitate
investigating the effects on the distribution of income of changes in wage rates
and in nonwage income levels, to name but a few of the interesting possi-
bilities. Such experiments would also permit determining the effects of such
Country or experiment Income concept Recipient unit Gini ratio
1 Unite States IRS adjusted gross incomeIndividual tax returns .46
2. Central Islip' Labor earnings Female workers .41 (max)
(no personal tax)
3. United States Pretax money income Families and unattached mdiv. .40
4. United Pretax money income Female-headed families .40
5. United States Income after taxes
and transfers
Families and unattached mdiv. .36
6. United States Pretax money income Families .35
7. Central Islip" Labor earnings Female workers .34 (mm)
(no personal tax)
8. Cannabis Pretax labor earnings All workers .31
9. United States Consumption expendituresFamilies and unattached mdiv. .31
10. India Consumption expendituresIndividuals .31
11. United States Pretax labor earnings Household heads, age 25-34 .29
12. Cannabis Pretax labor earnings Male workers, age 20-28 .29
13. United States Pretax wages and salaries Male workers, full time,
all indus.
.28
14. United States Pretax wages and salaries Male workers, full time
manufact.
.26
15. United KingdomPretax wages and salaries Male workers, full time,
employees
.21
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TABLE 2
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changes on the ranks of individuals within the distribution,a virtual im-
possibility using currently available data from national economicsystems.
Experiments along these lines would involve using substantiallylarger sample
sizes than those commonly employed in studiesof individual subject
behavior. While such experiments would be relativelyexpensive, the cost
would be but a fraction of the cost of comparablestudies using human
subjects.
3. Conclusion
This paper has explicated the use of twonew (for economics) technol-
ogies in the experimental analysis of economic behavior.Hopefully it is
clear from the discussion that as experimentalistswe are not suggesting
that economic research begins and ends with experiments.Rather, the use
of experimental methods can be an important element in theresearch process
having important interdependencies with "pure" theorydevelopment and
nonexperimental field observations as well. In fact thesurest sign of a
mature and healthy subdiscipline of experimentation within economicswill
be when practioners in these otherareas begin to incorporate outcomes of
experiments as premises in their theoriesor as observations in need of
explanation and replication using data from national economies.
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